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Abstract: The present investigation is aiming to provide a general overview of academic 
literature on related party transactions topic. The study is based on the positive perspective and 
on fundamental (descriptive – conceptual) research type. The main investigation techniques 
used were: the literature review, the documents analysis, the comparative analysis, the non-
participative observation. The principal result is that the literature generally provides two 
opposite theories based on which the related party transactions could be explained, namely:  the 
efficiency theory and the conflict of interest theory. However, a recent investigation proposed 
the related party transactions to be explained under a contingency perspective, which implies 
the overlap of these two theories mentioned above. 
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1  Introduction 
 
The development of intra-group transactions is facilitated by the economic globalization, 
whose manifestation is becoming stronger and stronger. Thus, according to statistics, more 
than a third of the world trade and over 80% of transactions involving technology transfer 
are carried out between related parties (Li, 2006: 28). 
According to Golub & McAfee (2011: 75), the modern corporation is a semi-autonomous 
aggregation of business units that run transactions both between them and with entities 
outside the group. Among the most obvious reasons behind the development of intra-group 
trading and of company internalization, are the following: the economies of scale, the 
reduction of fixed costs, the existence of unused production capacity, the avoiding of 
negotiations and of transaction costs, the division of production process, the specific 
characteristics of products, the need for security, the need for commercial secrecy, the 
accounting policies, the tax avoidance, the regional treaty provisions (EU, NAFTA), the 
abolition of protectionism (Georgopuolos et all., 2007: 48).  
Therefore, the transactions carried out with related parties represent a very important 
aspect of the present businesses, which might have an important impact on an entity as a 
whole. Having this regard, the present investigation is aiming to undertake a survey of 
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academic literature on related party transaction topic, in order to provide researchers and 
other interested persons with an overview of the relevant literature. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the first part presents the research 
methodology, the second generally describes the conceptual framework, then the related 
party transactions are analyzed under the perspective of the efficiency theory, under the 
perspective of the conflict of interests theory and under a perspective cumulating these two 
mentioned theories. The last part of the paper comprises the general conclusions of our 
work.        
 
2  Research methodology 
 
The purpose of the present investigation is to provide an overview of the relevant literature 
on related party transaction topic. Thus, as a starting point of our work, we selected the 
scientific databases that have been further used for getting articles: Emerald, Ebsco and 
SpringerLink. The period of research publication was set between January 2000 and 
October 2012. This period was random chosen, having in mind that an exhaustive research 
is impossible to be realized, as a very large amount of articles on this topic was published 
starting with the first part of 20th century. Nevertheless, we wanted to comprise in our 
study recent articles, in order to avoid expired information, but in the same time we wanted 
to comprise a period of time sufficiently large to surprise the evolution of the topic we are 
interested in. The research expression was “Related Party Transaction”. 
This study is generally based on the positive research perspective and on fundamental 
research methodology (descriptive – conceptual). The main investigation techniques used 
were: the literature review, the documents analysis, the comparative analysis, the non-
participative observation. 
 
3  Conceptual framework 
 
"Related party transactions" (hereinafter “RPT”) are transfers of resources, services or 
obligations between an entity and its related parties (IASB, 2011). 
The previous idea is outlined as well by Gordon et al. (2007: 82), according to which, even 
if the definition of "related party transactions" varies across different accounting 
referential, however, such transactions generally represent operations conducted between a 
company and its related parties, such as subsidiaries, affiliates, shareholders, directors, 
managers etc. 
According to Pizzo (2011: 1), the criteria for defining "related party transactions" might 
vary significantly across the academic studies in the area of accounting and corporate 
governance, or across the different accounting legislations, but in general, these criteria are 
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built on the assumption that engaging in RPT depends on "the ability to influence the 
conditions and contractual terms of transactions." 
In another train of thoughts, Chen et al. (2009: 286) note that "related party transactions" is 
a very ancient and widespread practice of business. Likewise, according to Gordon et al., 
(2007) cited by Lo et al. (2010: 226), the "related parties" are a natural element of 
businesses and many corporations undertake a large volume of such transactions, which 
are essential for their development. 
According to the studies conducted by Gordon et al. (2004), Kohlebeck & Mayhew (2004) 
cited by Gallery et al. (2008: 149-151) and Pizzo (2011: 1), in the academic literature, 
there are two main theories explaining the rationale of "related party transactions", as 
follows: 
a) the efficiency theory, in which views RPT represent effective transactions that 
support the economic needs of the company, and 
b) the conflict of interest theory, according to which RPT represent possible harmful 
transactions, which are run in the interests of directors / majority shareholders. 
Based on the study performed by Cheung et al. (2006), cited by Nekhili & Cherif (2011: 
294) there are three types of "transactions between related parties", such as follows: 
- transactions whose result is the reliable expropriation of minority shareholders (i.e. 
they may take the form of purchases / sales of assets, business dealings, etc.); 
- transactions that may be detrimental to minority shareholders (i.e. collection of 
liquid assets, relationships with subsidiaries); 
- transactions conducted for strategic purposes, that do not follow the expropriation  
of minority shareholders (i.e. takeover and capital investment alliances, 
acquisitions / sales of shares). 
Sun et al. (2011: 868) consider that "related party transactions" is a double-edged sword, 
meaning that majority shareholders might either to misappropriate company funds, either 
to inject capital for the benefit of all shareholders. 
This idea is also illustrated by the study conducted by Tong & Wang (2008: 187 - 201), 
whereby the majority shareholders are trying to take advantage of the power of control at 
their disposal to enhance either their own benefits or the company’s overall benefits, while 
RPT represent a way to achieve such goals. Results of the analysis undertaken by these 
two researchers revealed the following: 
- where the majority shareholders have a low participation rate (below 50%), they 
use RPT to enhance personal wealth at the expense of all shareholders wealth 
(negative effect on financial results); 
- where the majority shareholders hold a significant ownership share (over 50%), 
they use RPT to enhance wealth of firm as a whole (positive effect on financial 
results). 
Going on the same principle, the study conducted by Zhu et al. (2010: 256) concludes that 
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capital expropriation may be bidirectional, namely: 
- the majority shareholders expropriate, for personal purposes, the minority 
shareholders (embezzlement performed by former group); 
- the company expropriates shareholders and related parties, meaning that the 
company is granted with support by related parties (financing means). 
The study performed by Pizzo (2011: 2) points out the fact that before the financial 
scandals incurred in the last decade (i.e., Enron, Adelphia, Parmalat, WorldCom, Tyco, 
etc.), the "Related party transactions" had not represented a subject of detailed analysis for 
academic researchers or regulators and supervisors. Otherwise, research in the field of 
accounting focused more on analyzing potential transactions running biased, which do not 
respect the arm’s length principle and deviate from the market values (Mason, 1979; 
Brown 1980; Goodman & Lorensen, 1985) while research in the field corporate 
governance often tackled topics such as: management board composition and 
independence, the role of audit committees, remuneration of directors etc. After these 
events, however, related party transactions began to be increasingly associated with the 
idea of powerful instruments for financial fraud and expropriation. 
 
4  Related party transactions from the perspective of efficiency theory 
 
Generally, the concept of efficiency is related to certain criteria which compare (report) 
effects to efforts regardless of their nature and complexity. The understanding of this 
concept is vital for all human activities. According to the principle of efficiency, people 
want to get maximum effect with minimum effort (Zaman & Geamănu, 2006, p.9). 
From an economic point of view, the effectiveness is a fundamental principle, which is 
defined as the relationship between the inputs or the consumption of limited resources, on 
the one hand, and the amount of goods and services produced, on the other hand, at 
different aggregation levels of the economy (micro, mezo and macro) and different time 
horizons (Zaman & Geamănu, 2006, p.9). In other words, efficiency means the relationship 
between the effects obtained (results) and efforts (expenses) made for an economic activity 
in a given period of time. Therefore, economic efficiency refers to how to use the resources 
available so that the production of goods and services to achieve maximum possible 
(Sullivan & Steven, 2003, p.15). Economic efficiency concerns, as well, to the degree at 
which a firm is able to achieve the economic targets established for a certain period of time 
(Cristache, 2003). 
According to researchers Zaman & Geamănu (2006, p.9), "the basic principle of economic 
efficiency means not only the maximization of results while using a given amount of 
resources or minimization of costs per unit of output, but also the compatibility of 
competitive market mechanisms (generating profit and profitability) with the requirements 
to maximize the welfare of individuals and groups of individuals, to ensure equity and 
social justice ". 
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According to theory of economic efficiency, RPT represent effective transactions that 
support the economic needs of the company.  
Under this theory, among the most topics addressed within the literature, are (Pizzo, 2011: 
9): 
- reducing the transaction costs (Coase, 1937, Williamson, 1985, Fan & Goyal, 
2006); 
- creation of a market that are able to bring group benefits (Khanna & Palepu, 
1997); 
- investments in emerging markets (Fismann & Khanna, 2004); 
- transfer of technology and other resources (Chang & Hong, 2000; Moscariello, 
2007). 
Therefore, among the benefits of intra-group transactions that are conducted in good faith, 
are: (i) reducing transaction costs (Coase, 1937, quoted by Tong & Wang, 2008: 188) 
through vertical or horizontal integration which has the effect of (ii) net profit 
maximization and increase of operational profitability and competitiveness of the group as 
a whole (Chen et al., 2009: 287 - 295); (iii) increasing the return on assets (Zhuo & Hu, 
2001, cited by Chen et al., 2009: 286): (iv) means for allocating internal resources 
(Stauropoulus et al., 2011: 156); (v) the optimal allocation of internal resources, (vi) 
achieving economies of scale due to markets internationalization; (vii) reduction of risks 
associated to foreign markets; (viii) reduction of the time needed to conduct certain 
transactions; (ix) reducing the tax burden (Chen et al., 2009: 295). 
Gordon et al. (2007) cited by Lo et al. (2010: 226) emphasizes the idea that there are many 
corporations which carry a large amount of intra-group transactions not involving financial 
and accounting fraud. However, because very often such transactions are used fraudulently 
or improperly, their positive effects have come to be underestimated or overlooked (Chen 
et al., 2009: 286). 
 
5  Related party transactions from the perspective of conflict of interest 
theory 
 
According to this theory, each group of interest in an entity (each agent) works to achieve 
personal objectives and to maximize their own gain. Conflict occurs when there is 
discordance between the interests of the principal (shareholder, partner, manager, 
entrepreneur, roughly every ruler) and agent (manager, employee, subordinate). The main 
proponent of this theory is the well-known American economist Milton Friedman, in the 
view of which, the primary responsibility of organizations is to use resources to maximize 
long-term profits.  
Managers are agents of shareholders and have an obligation to act to satisfy their interests. 
The specific issue of conflict of interest theory is essential in corporate governance. For 
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companies with dispersed ownership, this theory attempts to explain "how to align 
managers' interests with those of shareholders" and for those with a concentrated 
ownership "how majority shareholders' interests can be aligned with those of minority 
shareholders" (Hu et al., 2009, p.193). The conflict of interest theory is rooted in utilitarian 
theory, according to which the outcome of an action can be considered ethical if it 
produces more good (i.e. more revenues) than harm (i.e. costs). In the literature, the 
conflict of interest theory is used as the theory of agent (or agency). 
Under this theory, among the most widely discussed topics are (Pizzo, 2011, p.4): 
- poor corporate governance: undermining non-executive directors functions 
(Vicknair et al., 1993; Weisbach, 1998; Denis & Sarin, 1999; Klein, 2002); 
- manipulation of financial results ("earnings management"), (Ming & Wong, 2003; 
Jian & Wong, 2003, 2008, Aharony et al., 2005); 
- embezzlement of assets ("tunneling") (Johnson et al., 2000; Jian & Wong, 2004, 
Jiang et al., 2005; Ryngaert & Thomas, 2007 ;); 
- employment of relatives in family firms; 
- misleading financial statements (Erickson et al., 2000, Swartz & Watkins, 2003; 
Targu, 2004). 
The classification realized by Nekhili & Cherif (2011: 296), retain as topics most often 
addressed the following: 
- correlation between RPT and handling financial results (Johnson et al., 2000a, b; 
Jiang & Wong, 2004; Thomas et al., 2004; Khanna & Zafeh, 2005); 
- diversion of capital, by transferring the capital from divisions with great potential 
towards those with low potential (Chang, 2003, Friedman et al., 2003; Jian & 
Wong, 2004; Marco & Mengoli, 2004, Liu & Lu, 2007 ); 
- transfer of wealth from minority shareholders towards the majority shareholders 
(Bianchi et al., 2002). 
The study undertaken by Nekhili & Cherif (2011: 291) also reveals that researches on RPT 
opportunism are based both on the emerging markets, which are recognized for their weak 
governance systems (Chang, 2003; Jian & Wong, 2004, Cheung et al., 2006, Lin et al., 
2010) but also on the European countries (Johnson et al., 2000a; Bianchi et al., 2002; 
Faccio & Lang, 2002; Marco & Mengoli, 2004) or even on American market (Shastri & 
Kahle, 2004, Gordon et al., 2006; Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 2010). 
Although transactions between related parties may have beneficial effects for group and, 
more broadly, for society, however, when they are used for opportunistic purposes, their 
effects can be disappointing because RPT has the ability to hide different stakes, such as: 
(i) enrichment of a party over the other parties involved in the transaction - the 
expropriation of minority shareholders in the benefit of controlling shareholders, officers 
or directors (Nekhili & Cherif, 2011: 291), (ii) manipulation of financial results to achieve 
the desired level of operational performance: return on investment, return on sales, return 
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on assets (Chen et al., 2009: 286), (iii) overestimation of earnings for various purposes, 
such as the right for the issuance of new shares (Ge et al., 2010 quoted by Stauropoulus et 
al., 2011: 156). 
The related party transactions undertaken for opportunistic purposes usually have one of 
the following forms: goods sold or purchased at different prices from the market values 
(higher priced); loans obtained on preferential terms; assets sold to benefit of controlling 
shareholders; fictitious sales. 
Given the above, it is not unusual the fact that that RPT is described by some researchers, 
including Seetharaman et al. (2004: 1063), as a form of fraud. On the other hand, the study 
realized by Gordon et al. (2007: 82) reveals that RPT is not more common in companies 
that commit fraud than in companies that do not occur in such practices. But, while RPT 
does not usually represent an indicator of fraud, however, when fraud exists, RPT is one of 
the main reasons behind it. Likewise, the results of empirical research undertaken by 
Stauropoulus et al. (2011: 161), shows that investors are more aware of the RPT involving 
actives than those involving products (because the former are more susceptible to fraud) 
while Noronha et al. (2008: 367) consider that it is difficult to assess whether a particular 
decision was taken for the real purpose of business or for other opportunistic purposes. 
Summarizing and quoting Chen et al. (2009: 295), the main negative goals of RPT are: 
expropriation of minority shareholders, misleading the financial results (earning 
management), misappropriation of assets (tunnelling), overestimation of income 
(propping). These goals are presented in more detail in the paragraphs below. 
A) Related party transactions and minority shareholders expropriation 
Hu et al. (2009: 191) points out that, in the academic literature there are numerous studies 
that examine the way in which shareholders engage in activities with the main purpose to 
expropriate the minority shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997, La Porta et al., 2000, 
Bertrand et al., 2002, Brockman et al., 2002, Cheung et al., 2006). 
According to the research conducted by Stauropoulus et al. (2011: 158), in the previous 
literature, there are two relevant currents quantifying the degree of expropriation of 
minority shareholders: 
- the indirect measurement of expropriation degree, by using various representative 
factors, such as: the legal system (La Porta et al., 1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 
Johnson, 2000; Brockman & Chung, 2003; Djkanov et al. 2008) or changes on 
cash flow control (Faccio et al., 2001, Claessens et al., 2002, Bertrand et al., 2003, 
Joh, 2003, Lemmon et al., 2003, Baek et al., 2004). The studies based on the 
indirect method do not examine whether the expropriation is due to specific 
actions of company management. 
- the direct measurement of expropriation degree, by examining the behavior of 
majority shareholders that may have direct impact on the company. The academic 
literature recognizes three types of actions: “earnings management”, “tunnelling” 
and “propping”  (“flip side of tunnelling” - Friedman et al., 2003). These will be 
explained in the next subsections. 
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Chen et al. (2009: 285, 295) concludes that the financial performance and the company's 
market value increase proportionally with the volume of transactions with related parties, 
while the operational performance decreases (where they can draw the conclusion that 
shareholders use RPT for their own interests). 
The study undertaken by Ameer & Azizan (2012: 790) emphasizes the idea that minority 
shareholders activism (such as, for example, setting up at government level, an association 
representing minority interests) is an effective tool to reduce expropriation techniques 
(including RPT) used by shareholders. 
B) Related party transactions and “earnings management” (financial results 
manipulation) 
In the academic literature there is no an universally accepted definition of “earnings 
management” (i.e. financial results manipulation techniques).  
In their study, Noronha et al. (2008: 367-369) present certain of the most representative 
definitions for the expression “earnings management” given by researchers interested in 
this subject, such as follows: “deliberately engaging in transactions within the constraint of 
generally accepted accounting standard in order to achieve the desired financial results” 
(Davidson et al., 1987); “intervention in the process of external financial reporting in order 
to get some private gains” (Shipper 1989); “manipulation of financial results occurs when 
during the financial reporting process, managers use their judgment to structure 
transactions so as to alter certain earnings or misinform stakeholders about the real 
economic performance of the company or to influence certain future contracts which 
depend on the financial result” (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). 
According to Nekhili & Cherif (2011: 294), although the academic literature of the past 15 
years has written extensively on financial results manipulation and on creative accounting, 
however, the relationship between RPT and earnings management has received less 
attention from researchers. In this regard, the studies performed by Gordon et al. (2006) 
and Henry et al. (2006) are useful for understanding the challenges of RPT in terms of 
manipulating financial results and providing fraudulent financial statements. Therefore, the 
transactions between related parties may be considered an “instrument of earnings 
management, with the purpose of presenting financial statements acceptable or favorable, 
or meeting the requirements of managers reporting results that are impelled, in their turn, 
to meet the expectations of investors / creditors”. 
Noronha et al. (2008: 368) shows that, according to the literature, there are four reasons 
underlying techniques of “earnings management”: acceptable indebtedness, the pressure of 
capital markets, tax considerations and management remuneration. 
Ortega & Grant (2003) cited by Noronha et al. (2008: 369) classify the financial results 
manipulation techniques into four categories: the moment of revenues recognition, the 
moment of expenses recognition, using unrealistic assumptions to estimate liabilities, real 
trading operations. 
In the studies conducted by Lo et al. (2010: 227) and Stauropoulus et al. (2011: 158) there 
are presented two ways in which financial results might be manipulated: 
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- manipulating the moment of recording a transaction into the accounting evidences, 
which involves moving profits from one year to another, being therefore a 
manipulation technique with temporary effects; 
- manipulation of transfer prices, which do not affect future profits, being therefore a 
manipulation technique with permanent effects. 
As a result of the empirical study conducted on China market, Noronha et al. (2008: 367) 
conclude that financial results manipulation techniques are influenced by ownership 
structure and size of company. Thus, public companies manipulate the results for purposes 
relating to the remuneration of managers, while private companies pay more attention to 
reducing tax expenditures. 
C) Related party transactions and “tunnelling” (asset misappropriation) 
The term “tunnelling” was introduced by Johnson (2000), cited by Hu et al. (2009: 191) 
and means the “deviation of resources between companies in order to expropriate the 
minority shareholders”. Thus, Ameer & Azizan (2012: 777), quoting Johnson et al. (2000) 
argue that asset misappropriation techniques favor redistribution of resources, through 
improper means, between group companies instead of dividend payments. 
Lo et al. (2010: 227) believes that asset misappropriation disguises the actual performance 
of the company and hides to minority shareholders the private benefits that control bring to 
majority shareholders, which usually translate to losses for the firsts. The diversion of 
resources as a result of running RPT usually triggers a decrease in the value of minority 
shares, which then transforms into a significant reduction in firm value. Stauropoulus et al. 
(2011: 158) consider that the techniques of assets misappropriation are of a significant 
importance for corporations with concentrated ownership. 
D) Related party transactions and “propping” (income overvaluation) 
The term “propping” refers to techniques used by some companies in order to get a certain 
level of profits. According to some researchers (i.e. Pizzo, 2011), “propping” represents 
the “pre-tunnelling” phase, meaning that through propping techniques there is temporarily 
helped a company in bankruptcy, which in the future can be a source of embezzlement 
(assets misappropriation or tunnelling). In other words, those using techniques of 
"propping" hope that by saving a company from bankruptcy, they may misappropriate 
more funds in the future. Therefore, on short-term, the “propping” techniques are 
beneficial to minority shareholders, being a kind of guarantee for them (Pizzo, 2011: 8). 
The techniques of “profits overvaluation” (or “propping”) are often used in jurisdictions 
where economic institutions are weakly developed. The study undertaken by Jian & Wong 
(2010: 70) shows that Chinese companies listed on stock exchanges ensure a certain level 
of gains (“propping”) by conducting abnormal transactions with shareholders. This 
evidence suggests that RPT can be used for purposes specific to capital markets, namely 
for achieving a sufficient level of profits (whether in order to qualify for listing, or in order 
that, after listing, to avoid the imminent de-listing in cases where a company registered 
losses). 
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As the “tunnelling” techniques, the “propping” techniques are of a significant importance 
for corporations with concentrated ownership (Stauropoulus et al., 2011: 158) because the 
majority shareholders use intra-group transactions with the purpose to transfer income to 
related parties (Chang, 2003; Jian & Wong, 2004 cited by Tong & Wang, 2008, p.188). 
Relationship of mutual influence between the company and related party transactions 
According to the study conducted by Nekhili & Cherif (2011: 291,) related party 
transactions are influenced by: the majority shareholders voting rights, the size of the 
steering committee, the independence of the audit committee, the indebtedness ratio, the 
fact to be listed on the capital market. The research conducted by Hu et al. (2009: 190) 
emphasizes that related party transactions are more common: within companies with 
concentrated ownership, within companies where the function of chairman of general 
meeting and the function of executive director is satisfied by same person and within 
companies where the external directors' remuneration are consistent. According to Gallery 
et al. (2008: 147), the decision of a company to engage in RPT is dictated by its financial 
condition and is associated with low performance. 
In general, previous studies have shown the following aspects: 
- the existence of an inversely proportional relationship between the development of 
RPT and the market value of companies (Gordon et al., 2004a; Jian & Wong, 
2004; Gordon et al., 2004b cited by Gallery et al., 2008: 149; Claessens & Fan., 
2006, Murphy et al., 2009: 57; Nekhili & Cherif, 2011: 291; Kohlebeck & 
Mazhew, 2010 cited by Stauropoulus et al., 2011: 157) and between RPT and 
return on assets (Kohlebeck & Mayhew, 2004, quoted by Gallery et al., 2008: 
150); 
- the existence of a directly proportional relationship between the development of 
RPT and profitability (Cheung et al., 2006; Kohlebeck & Mazhew, 2010 cited by 
Stauropoulus et al., 2011: 157); 
- the association of RPT with a weaker corporate governance (Gordon et al., 2004b 
cited by Gallery et al., 2008: 149; Kohlebeck & Mayhew, 2004, quoted by Gallery 
et al., 2008: 150). 
Therefore, we can conclude that RPT is useful to achieve objectives such as: remuneration 
of managers, profitability, external contracts, reducing tax costs. In such a context, RPT 
may include: a weak usage of resources (moral hazard problem) or a weak presentation of 
information (adverse selection), (Pizzo, 2011: 5). 
Monitoring and disclosure of related party transactions 
Due to the fact that, before the great financial scandals erupted in the past decade, RPT din 
not represented an area of detailed analysis neither for researchers from academia, nor for 
regulators, the European corporate governance rules existing before the years 2002-2003 
have ignored the RPT topic. Thus, details of such transactions could be found only in 
financial reports, which were used both for accounting purposes and for purposes of 
corporate governance. 
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Therefore, in order to curb the negative effects associated with RPT, the legislators have 
proposed certain solutions, such as (Pizzo, 2011, p.6): 
- monitoring the activities, by using internal monitoring mechanisms: internal 
control, internal audit committee evaluation, approvals from the board of directors, 
the existence of independent directors, approvals of the General Assembly 
(Gallery et al., 2008: 153) and also external monitoring mechanisms: financial 
audit, monitoring by creditors, financial inter-mediators, media (Gillan, 2006 cited 
by Gallery et al., 2008: 153); 
- detailed disclosures (with respect to: the transaction type, the amount, the terms 
and conditions, the fit with the market principles, etc.); 
- classification of certain transactions as “harmful” (such as “employee loans”). 
Gallery et al. (2008: 147) believe that in order to reduce the negative effects associated to 
RPT, external monitoring is more effective than the mechanisms specific to internal 
corporate governance (by conducting an empirical study on small businesses in Australia, 
these researchers found no direct correlation between the mechanism specific to corporate 
governance and RPT, unlike other studies as Gordon et al. (2004b), which shows exact the 
contrary). 
In the academic literature, the non – identification of RPT is considered a key factor of an 
audit failure. However, the major financial scandals demonstrate that the problem is not the 
non – identification of RPT (i.e. Enron or Adelphia auditors were aware about the 
existence of RPT), but deficiency of information regarding such transactions. In the terms 
of cost / benefit, an auditor is trying to find the related parties and the transactions 
undertaken with them,  as long as the expected benefits brought by the discovery of such 
transactions is greater than the cost involved by a detailed analysis procedure (Gordon et 
al., 2007: 96). 
Although the academic studies, including Chen et al. (2009: 295) emphasized the idea that 
the introduction in legislation of a more complex requirements disclosure regarding RPT 
(especially in terms of transfer pricing) should be an urgent priority, however, the research 
conducted by Nekhili & Cherif (2011: 294) shows that there is currently no standardized 
procedure by which companies can inform the market if and how the related party 
transactions are verified. Moreover, according to Gordon et al. (2006), internal checks are 
not enough. The financial reporting standards, the capital market authorities and the 
legislation require information that is sometimes doubled, sometimes contradictory. 
However, the general purpose is to improve the quality of information available to all 
stakeholders and to impose the obligation of information disclosure regarding RPT (where 
they may affect the results and financial position of a company). 
Notwithstanding the above, researches in the area of capital markets shows that legislation 
requiring detailed presentation of related party transactions is associated with the 
developed capital markets (Djankov et al., 2008, La Porta et al., 2006, quoted by 
Stauropoulus et al. , 2011: 157). 
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In another train of thoughts, it is necessary to mention that the rules on monitoring and 
disclosure of RPT were strongly influenced by conflicts of interest theory and agency 
perspective, while efficient transaction theory has little influence on these rules (Pizzo, 
2011: 10). 
 
6  Related party transactions – a contingent approach 
 
Generally, within the academic literature, RPT are analyzed in an abstract theoretical 
framework, according to one of the two theories (i.e. efficiency or conflict of interest), 
Thus, their classification is made by certain features (the benefits - for the first mentioned 
theory, the risk for second one), without taking into account the specific institutional or 
organizational context that may affect the nature of the operations (Pizzo, 2011: 10). The 
traditional research methodology on RPT is presented in the below figure. 
 
                                                                                            
                                                                                    Theoretical 
                                                                                    Framework 




                   
                                                                                       RPT                                                                         
                                                                                                               Interpretation 
 
 
    
                                                                                                              Regulatory                          
                                                                                                              Implications 
          
                  Fig.1. Traditional research methodology on RPT 










          Self - dealing                                  Sound economic 
    transactions                                      exchanges 
           RPT Disciplines                        RPT Disciplines 
- Detailed on-going disclosures;         - Period disclosures                     
- Board / assembly approval;                 requirements;                                                   
- Ban on some operations.                   - Monitoring mechanisms. 
 
 E u r o E c o n o m i c a  
Issue 2(32)/2013                                                                               ISSN: 1582-8859 
 
COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 
113 
The possibility that these two theories to coexist has never taken into account. Both 
theories have inconsistencies or deficiencies, and sometimes offer different interpretations 
(Pizzo, 2011: 10). In the current reality, RPT cannot be strictly classified into one of these 
two categories, and the monitoring and disclosure requirements may not achieve the 
desired goals, may involve greater complexity and may cost to match. On the other hand, 
addressing the idea that RPT are always efficient transactions involves deregulation, and 
may ignore some risks associated with such transactions, which results in decreased 
investor confidence in the company. Therefore, the contingent approach is the solution. 
Pizzo proposed a model for RPT analysis under a contingent perspective, by the 
intersection of these two theories. This model is built based on the study of Aguilera et al. 
(2008), and on further examination of the causes and consequences of RPT, which are 
influenced by: i) the organizational and social context, and by ii) the complementarities / 
substitution of corporate governance factors (Pizzo, 2011: 12). The new approach is 
presented in the below figure. 
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The contingent approach of RPT proposed by Pizzo is based on contingency theory. 
According to Waweru et al. (2004, p.677), this theory was developed by Burns & Stalker 
(1961) and Lawrence & Lorsch (1967). The fundamental premise suggested by the 
contingency theory is that there is no a single strategy that can be effective in any context 
(Sousa & Bradley, 2009, p.441). 
By extrapolating the previous idea, we can say that the perspective on related party 
transactions offered by the contingency theory can be formulated as follows: RPT cannot 
be strictly classified as either harmful or beneficial transactions, but their classification 
depends on the circumstances in which they appear (economic constraints, global 
competition, technological developments, size and type of organization, the real interests 
of the shareholders or managers, etc.). 
 
7  Conclusion 
 
The purpose of the present investigation was to provide an overview of the academic 
literature on related party transaction topic. Thus, as a result of previous researches survey, 
we found out that there are two opposite theories which explain the related party 
transaction undertaken: the efficiency theory and the conflict of interest theory.  
Based on the efficiency theory, the related party transactions are viewed as faithful 
operations, which are essential for business development and which bring various benefits 
to entities, such as: reduction of transaction costs, possibility to expand on new markets, 
transfer of technology and other resources, increase the operational profitability, increase 
the competitiveness of the group as a whole etc.  
Based on the conflict of interest theory, the related party transactions are viewed as 
harmful practices, undertaken with opportunistic purposes, such us: expropriation of 
minority shareholders by majority shareholders, earnings management, tunnelling, 
propping etc. In order to avoid the negative impact of RPT, the various authorities in 
charge with these practices have introduced certain disclosure requirements, which are 
sometimes doubled, sometimes insufficient. 
The research conducted by (Pizzo, 2011), brings a fresh perspective on the way on which 
the related party transactions are to be interpreted. Generally, the RPT can be strictly 
classified neither as dealings serving only fraudulent purposes nor as sound economic 
operations. Thus, the researcher propose the adoption of a contingency perspective which 
implies an overlap of the theoretical frameworks represented by the conflict of interests 
and by the efficient transactions hypothesis, and obliges to interpret RPT through the lens 
of contingent factors concerning specific organizational contexts and institutional 
environments.   
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